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In his target article, Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle geared 
specifically to questions of animal sentience in the context of decision-making procedures that 
concern animal welfare. Birch's formulation — which he calls the "Animal Sentience 
Precautionary Principle" (ASPP) — requires that "[w]here there are threats of serious, negative 
animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the sentience of the animals in 
question shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent those 
outcomes" (p. 3). Grounding the ASPP are two pragmatic rules for its implementation: a science-
based bar (BAR) providing evidence for attributing sentience to a nonhuman animal; and a 
practical decision rule (ACT) to guide nonhuman animal protection legislation justified by BAR. 
The combination of BAR and ACT is intended to provide a practical method for implementing 
ASPP. 
As Birch notes, I myself have invoked the precautionary principle regarding teleost sentience 
and welfare legislation (Jones 2016). And I am sympathetic to Birch's proposal to develop a robust 
ASPP, since the current state of global animal welfare legislation relative to even the most 
rigorously confirmed evidence on animal sentience and cognition is at best regressive (Jones 
2013), and, at worst — particularly with regard to food animal legislation in the U.S. — atrocious. 
But I do want to make just three brief points: 
 
1. Certainty. It's important to highlight Birch's point that, whatever evidentiary BAR we commit 
to regarding the sentience of a particular animal species (or order), we cannot require anything 
close to certainty before granting legal protections. A common challenge from skeptics of animal 
sentience involves questions of the form, "How can one ever really know that species X is 
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sentient?" However, that's a very different sense of “know” from the one used in claims of animal 
sentience (Jones 2014). That's not what scientists who make such claims mean by “know” when 
they say, for example, that we now know that chickens are sentient. When one asserts that 
research now supports the claim that teleosts are sentient (Brown 2015; 2016; or Sneddon 2015), 
it's important to reiterate that this claim is (a) provisional (as are all scientific claims), and (b) 
justified through inference to the best explanation, a point that Birch makes and one worth 
reiterating. 
2. Burden of proof. It's also important to note that there is a bit of burden shifting going on here. 
On the one hand, some of us who are concerned with animal welfare may demand a stronger 
ASPP than the one that Birch proposes, for example: 
 
sASSP:  In cases where any uncertainty exists regarding the sentience of a particular 
species, we ought to treat every member of that species as though they were sentient. 
 
Barring panpsychism, sASPP is implausible, as it would require that we treat every living thing as 
though they were sentient, an impractical and overly demanding BAR and ACT, to say the least 
(Fischer 2016). 
However, it's worth noting that historically — from the Cartesians to the logical positivists —
philosophers and scientists writing on and investigating nonhuman animal cognition have 
assumed an equally strong inverse precautionary principle (a kind of "decautionary" principle), 
advising that in cases where uncertainty exists about the sentience of a particular species, we 
should treat each member of that species as though they were not sentient, unless rigorously 
demonstrated otherwise. But this assumption, like sASPP, is also implausible and unreasonably 
strong. This decautionary principle is captured most pithily by that fundamental precept of 
parsimony in comparative psychology, Lloyd Morgan's Canon, according to which, with regard to 
an animal's behavioral states, "[i]n no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the 
exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of 
one which stands lower in the psychological scale" (as quoted in Rollin 2011, p. 121). 
(Interestingly, Rollin 2011 presents incontrovertible textual evidence that Morgan's Canon 
actually assumes the truth of panpsychism.) [See also Rollin 2017, this journal – ed.] 
If history is any indication, no matter what evidentiary BAR we choose short of full-blown first-
person introspective, intersubjective verbal self-reports, skeptics will seek (and sometimes find) 
counterexamples that maintain human exceptionalism. We need not cede ground here, especially 
given the abysmal, anti-scientific, and downright dangerous record of ignorant and racist scientific 
pronouncements on the issue of pain attribution in humans (see, for example, Hoffman, 
Trawalter, Axt, & Oliver 2016; and Rollin 2006, chapter 9). Theoretically, the scope of views of 
animal sentience and consciousness can range from philosophical zombism at one extreme, to 
panpsychism at the other; but why the burden of proof falls closer to the former than the latter 
cannot, itself, be justified on scientific grounds. Indeed, given that, evolutionarily speaking, pain 
and suffering are probably very old phenomena, it would be strange if pain were not widespread 
across varied taxa, did not provide selective advantage, and did not serve an adaptive function 
similar to whatever adaptive function it serves in humans. Practically speaking, we find this kind 
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of commonsense thinking reflected in the British (but not U.S.) Animal Welfare Act which covers 
"all vertebrates."  
 
3. Necessity. I would be remiss were I to fail to point out that according to the USDA (usda.gov), 
approximately 42 billion land animals globally (1.02 billion cattle, 1.2 billion pigs, and 40 billion 
chickens) — vertebrates who we know with near-certainty are sentient — suffer and die for 
human consumption. Our best theories of science regarding the cognitive and sensitive properties 
of these beings make unnecessary the implementation of any kind of precautionary principle 
regarding their abilities to experience pain and suffering. Yet, despite this fact, and despite 
legislative welfare regulations, these animals suffer unspeakable pain, suffering, and death during 
their nasty, brutish, and short (but perhaps not short enough) lives. Better science, near-certainty 
regarding sentience, or increased welfare legislation alone will not end the savagery that is visited 
upon billions of animals under cover of speciesism and human exceptionalism. That task requires 
transcending our own bad faith by untelling the stories we tell ourselves about the meaning and 
necessity of animal pain and suffering. As Sanbonmatsu (2011) argues, "[b]y telling ourselves that 
we have no 'choice' but to kill and to consume animals, thereby refusing responsibility for our 
participation in terror, we undermine our claims to being the kind of being that alone can exercise 
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